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GILES V. CALIFORNIA: AVOIDING SERIOUS DAMAGE TO
CRAWFORD’S LIMITED REVOLUTION

by
*
Robert P. Mosteller
This Article endorses the result in Giles v. California, which limited the
reach of the forfeiture through wrongdoing exception to those instances
where “the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness
from testifying.” Largely for practical and policy reasons, I find this
result important and proper. Given the apparently limited coverage of
out-of-court statements by the confrontation doctrine under the
testimonial statement approach, expansive application of the forfeiture
doctrine could have gutted much of its already restricted protection.
I also briefly sketch where I believe the new confrontation doctrine that
Crawford v. Washington produced stands in protecting the rights of
defendants against problematic hearsay statements. My judgment is that
these developments have been important and largely positive but limited
in impact. Moreover, the mini-revolution that Crawford spawned
appears to have largely run its course, and the more recent decision of the
Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts which concluded that
forensic certificates are testimonial, does not change that assessment.
Finally, Giles adds further evidence of the limited power of originalism
to determine specific applications for the Confrontation Clause doctrine
in a modern world that differs, both in legal structure and values, from
the Framing era. Fortunately, the splintered decisions and analysis
suggest that this misguided approach is losing its hold on the Court’s
confrontation analysis and that pragmatic and policy concerns may play
a stronger role on future developments in this area.
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INTRODUCTION

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v.
1
Washington has been accurately described as revolutionary. As time
passes, however, my sense is that it is more revolutionary in analytical
method than in changed outcomes affording greater confrontation
protection to defendants when the prosecution offers hearsay against
them. I do not want to denigrate Crawford’s significant impact. Clearly,
protection in some extremely problematic areas, such as statements by
criminal co-participants taken in police custody that incriminate both the
person making the statement and the defendant, is markedly improved,
and those statements are now uniformly excluded by Crawford’s clear
command absent confrontation. As to such statements and statements of
witnesses to the police about past crimes, excluded by Davis v.
2
Washington, the accused now has real protection.
Nevertheless, I view the Confrontation Clause rulings under the
“testimonial statement” approach sketched so far by the Supreme Court
with a sense of regret. They appear to have left many unreliable,
incriminating, and accusatory hearsay statements offered against a
criminal defendant admissible and unregulated, despite the complete
3
absence of confrontation. As far as the results are concerned, rather
than the analysis, most rulings under the testimonial statement approach
are largely the same as they were under the vanquished system of Ohio v.
Roberts, which admitted most hearsay and did so through an easily
4
satisfied reliability assessment rather than requiring confrontation.
1

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
3
Of course, those who find Crawford’s testimonial approach clearly correct will
respond that the Framers meant that none of these unreliable, incriminating, and
accusatory statements should be covered by the Clause. I remain unconvinced that
the Court’s approach, which is certainly a plausible construction, applied in the
narrow fashion that its decisions permit and the lower courts have generally
employed, captures either the true meaning or the full power of the Sixth
Amendment’s right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. I continue to hope that a more robust approach will be
embraced that broadens the scope of protection and encourages confrontation of
available declarants.
4
448 U.S. 56 (1980). An example of how under Crawford results have changed as
to one class of statements but remained the same for others as they were under
Roberts can be seen in cases involving children. The lower courts with a relatively high
degree of uniformity exclude statements made by children to police officers, which
2
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Although the new doctrine and its reach have not been fully spelled out,
5
an outline of much of its perimeter appears to have taken shape. Rather
than producing a substantive revolution barring admission of
unconfronted hearsay against the accused or producing more actual
confrontation, Crawford presently appears to have been somewhat more
of a fascinating paradigm shift in analysis that produces largely the same
outcomes.
This Article has two major components and a new installment of an
earlier made point. The first major Part sketches out roughly where the
new confrontation doctrine stands as a protector of the accused against
unconfronted hearsay. As stated above, my judgment is that the
are virtually always made after an emergency has ended, but admit similar statements
with regard to their accusatory content made to family members, teachers, and
medical personnel. See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 944–50
(2007) [hereinafter Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation]. See also id. at 937–43
(noting that the Supreme Court suggested these different results as to virtually
identical accusatory statements in Crawford where it suggested that the decision in
White v. Illinois, may have been in error but noting only the statement made to “an
investigating police officer”). White, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). Indeed, in Whorton v.
Bockting, the Court ruled that the testimonial statement approach offered even less
protection than Roberts, freeing unreliable nontestimonial statements from any
Confrontation Clause scrutiny. Whorton, 549 U.S. 406, 419–20 (2007). See discussion
infra note 6.
5
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), the Court held that
forensic certificates prepared by government laboratories that established that the
white powder possessed by the defendant was cocaine was testimonial and required
the testimony of an analyst. How that case fits into this pattern of a serviceable but
constrained doctrine is a little more difficult to assess, and its long-term impact on
development of the doctrine is somewhat uncertain. Although Justice Scalia may have
overstated the simplicity of the analysis given the strident disagreement of the dissent,
he appeared largely accurate in terms of the logic of the testimonial approach in
stating that “[t]his case involves little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford.” Id. at 2542 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
The certificates at issue were formal documents that stated that the substance
found in the defendant’s possession was cocaine, which is the precise testimony the
analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. Id. at 2532. Melendez-Diaz is
firm in its resolution that forensic certificates prepared by government laboratories
are testimonial, which has important practical consequences for how the government
must prove its case when such evidence is involved, but there are suggestions that the
victory is precarious and could prove to be a narrow one. The case was decided by a
five-to-four vote, and Justice Kennedy’s dissent voiced some skepticism of the entire
testimonial concept in his protest that “[t]he Court’s reliance on the word
‘testimonial’ is of little help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of
the Clause.” Id. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Finally, the Court quickly granted
certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia, to examine the constitutionality of procedural
limitations that may be imposed on the confrontation promised by Melendez-Diaz.
Briscoe, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). With the exception of Justice Scalia, its architect, the
testimonial approach appears no longer to provide a broad animating mandate for
the Court. The impact of Melendez-Diaz is not fully known, but its extension of the
logic of the testimonial approach to forensic certificates does not promise an
expansive reach to the testimonial doctrine.
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developments have been important and largely positive, but limited.
Moreover, it appears that the mini-revolution has basically run its course.
The second major Part of the Article examines and endorses the
result in Giles v. California, which limited the reach of the forfeiture
through wrongdoing exception to those instances in which “the
defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
6
testifying.” Largely for practical and policy reasons, I find this result
important and proper. Given the apparently limited coverage of out-ofcourt statements by the confrontation doctrine under the testimonial
statement approach, expansive application of the forfeiture doctrine
7
could have gutted much of its already restricted protection.
The Justices’ disagreement regarding analysis of Framing-era caselaw adds a sub point that further illustrates my argument that originalism
has limited power to point to, let alone mandate, specific applications for
the Confrontation Clause in a modern world that differs both in legal
structure and values. Of course, constitutional text and the history of the
hearsay rule, its exceptions, and what that history might tell us about the
understanding of the Confrontation Clause are points from which all
who would speak to the proper scope of the right should take guidance. I
believe we have once again seen that much interpretation is required
from meager sources to determine what the state of the common law was,
8
and this is just the first step. The task, which is to determine what the
legal history should mean for modern practice, becomes even more
9
conceptually difficult. Perhaps broad outlines are discernable through
6

128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008) (describing the scope of the common law
forfeiture rule).
7
In addition, the Confrontation Clause now has no application to statements not
considered testimonial. In Whorton, the Court stated: “[u]nder Roberts, an out-of-court
nontestimonial statement not subject to prior cross-examination could not be
admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability. Under Crawford, on
the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements and
therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.” Whorton, 549
U.S. at 420 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56). Thus, the statements excluded by the
Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, would now likely no longer be examined at all
under the Confrontation Clause. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). See generally Robert P.
Mosteller, Confrontation as Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Crawford’s Birth Did Not
Require that Roberts Had to Die, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 685, 722 (2007) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Constitutional Criminal Procedure] (noting that Wright is quite likely no longer viable as
a Confrontation Clause case because the statements would be considered
nontestimonial, and that generally, the area of statements by children was one of the
few situations where the reliability analysis of Roberts had resulted in the exclusion of
unconfronted hearsay).
8
See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 923–33 (discussing the
difficulty of knowing what the Framers knew regarding English cases decided prior to
the enactment of the Confrontation Clause but only available in America in their
present form long afterward).
9
See Mosteller, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, supra note 7, at 718–22
(discussing the difficulty of knowing and translating history into application in a very
different environment).
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this process, but specific results rarely can be determined by originalism.
Instead, I believe it is usually an indirect form of value selection couched
in the choice of historical construction of hearsay law.
One certainly finds discord in the multiple opinions in Giles and
some evidence of frustration with the delegation of important policy
issues to case analysis of a distant and only vaguely perceived age. The
hopeful sign in these disparate opinions is that that the Confrontation
Clause may in the future be shaped more directly by considerations of
policy and doctrinal prudence.
II. THE COVERAGE AND IMPACT OF
CRAWFORD’S TESTIMONIAL CONCEPT
In contrast to Ohio v. Roberts, which provided protection that was
figuratively “a mile wide and an inch deep,” Crawford establishes
protection that is deep but apparently narrow. It provides real bite to the
hearsay that it defines as covered by the Confrontation Clause, which are
“testimonial” statements. If such hearsay has not been subject to
confrontation in some earlier trial or trial-like hearing, or if the person
who made the statement is not presently subject to confrontation, then it
is excluded unless it falls within one of a quite limited number of
exceptions.
The chief limiting factor on the scope of Crawford’s reach is not
whether it falls within an exception, because the exceptions are generally
narrow. Rather, the limitation primarily flows from the apparently
restrictive nature of the “testimonial” concept as that term is being
developed by the Court. Even though an incriminating, unconfronted
statement is offered to convict the defendant, it is not covered at all by
the Confrontation Clause unless the statement is deemed testimonial.
To date, the Court has held that two types of statements are
definitely testimonial. First, in Crawford, it held that statements by coparticipants in a crime made to the police in response to interrogation
and while in custody are testimonial. Second, in Davis v. Washington, the
Court ruled that statements made to the police in the field are
testimonial if they concern past events and are not made during an
10
ongoing emergency. Davis also eliminated a number of possible
formalistic requirements of Crawford, concluding that a testimonial
11
statement need not be made while the witness is in custody, or in

10
547 U.S. 813 (2006). I mean generally to describe here the second category of
statements within Confrontation Clause protection but without using the Court’s
technical detail, which requires that “the primary purpose of the interrogation [must
be] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 822.
11
Id. at 830 (concluding the statement made by Amy Hammon to the police was
formal enough even though not made after Miranda warnings at the station house).
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12

response to police questioning, and it need not be embodied in a
13
witness statement, but could be contained in officer notes or memory.
However, the Davis Court did unequivocally state that “formality is . . .
14
essential to testimonial utterance.” Specifically, it concluded that “It
imports sufficient formality . . . that lies to [police] officers are criminal
15
offenses.”
Although the issues have not been clearly addressed, the apparent
direction of the Supreme Court is toward application of the
Confrontation Clause primarily to statements made to investigative
agents, likely with few exceptions. Statements of co-conspirators are not
covered by the testimonial concept because they must be made “in
furtherance of the conspiracy” and therefore “would probably never
16
be . . . testimonial.” Most business records clearly are not covered for
similar reasons because their general purpose is not the production of
17
testimony.
In Giles, Justice Scalia stated that “[s]tatements to friends and
neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to physicians in
the course of receiving treatment” would not be covered by the
18
testimonial concept. The sweep of Scalia’s statement may have been
slightly too broad, but it reveals how the prime architect of the new
Confrontation Clause doctrine presumes the law will develop. Crawford

12
Id. at 822 n.1 (“The Framers were no more willing to exempt from crossexamination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they
were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”).
13
Id. at 826 (concluding that the confrontation right could not be evaded by
having a “note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the
declarant” rather than presenting it in formal written statement form, and that the
clause covered both a “writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory
(and perhaps notes) of [a police] officer”).
14
Id. at 830 n.5.
15
Id. at 831 n.5; See also id. at 826–27 (“The solemnity of even an oral declaration
of relevant past fact to an investigating officer is well enough established by the severe
consequences that can attend a deliberate falsehood.” (citing examples of federal and
state criminal punishment for false statements to investigators)); Robert P. Mosteller,
Softening the Formality and Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U.
L. REV. 429 (2007) (discussing generally the effect of Davis to reduce the rigidity of
the testimonial concept, certainly as suggested by the definition taken from Justice
Thomas’s concurring decision in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring)).
16
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008).
17
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539–40 (2009) (“Business
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created
for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (“Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their
nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy.”).
18
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692–93.
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suggests that statements to friends and neighbors typically would not be
covered because they were not made with any thought to being used in
19
court, and Davis further suggests that in most situations, they also lack
20
the formality required of testimonial statements. Statements to doctors
in the course of receiving treatment would not be covered by the
testimonial statement concept because “the primary purpose of the
interrogation” is not “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
21
22
to later criminal prosecution,” and many of them lack formality.
Of course, statements should be testimonial in some situations even
if not made to investigative officers, but those will likely be extremely
rare. One group would be “technically informal statements when used to
23
evade the formalized process.” Another relatively clear group, albeit
likely a small one, would include written statements, which would possess
the formality of the written form, given, for example, to a friend or
neighbor with instructions that they be delivered to police investigators if
24
anything should happen to the author. Certainly some issues remain to
be resolved regarding the circumstances that produce testimonial
statements, but the numerous signals appear to point in a consistent
direction: few statements, but clearly a few, will be found to be
testimonial if made to persons other than police investigators.

19

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.”).
20
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
21
Id. In order to be testimonial, investigating a possible crime does not have to
be the exclusive purpose of the police obtaining the statement; “[o]bjectively viewed,
[it must be] the primary, if not . . . the sole, purpose of the interrogation.” Id. at 830.
Whether Davis shifted the focus to the purpose of the questioner rather than the
intent of the speaker is unclear, but it is clearly suggested by the Court’s language. See
Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4 at 918–19, 938, 942–43, 947
(discussing the apparent shift of focus from Crawford, where the intent of the speaker
was clearly dominant, to Davis, which appears to shift the focus to the intent of the
questioner, and the impact of such a shift to the analysis of cases involving children).
22
See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a victim’s statement
is not ‘testimonial,’ perhaps because she made it to a nurse, the statement could
come into evidence under this rule. But where the statement is made formally to a
police officer, the majority’s rule would keep it out. Again this incongruity arises in
part because of pre-existing confrontation-related rules.” (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at
830 n. 5 (“[F]ormality is indeed essential to testimonial utterance.”))).
23
Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although the majority did not
explicitly embrace this formulation, its discussion indicates it would obviously adopt
at least that much of an extension. Id. at 830 n.5. Concrete examples of such evasive
statements are not clear to me, but the concept might cover a government official
suggesting that a witness make statements to private citizens or preserve them in a
personal document.
24
See, e.g., State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 521, 527–28 (Wis. 2007) (concluding
that written statements made by a murder victim to be delivered by a neighbor to the
police if anything happened to her were testimonial).
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In the child abuse area, I have identified a class of statements that
should be somewhat problematic for courts to categorize and should be
difficult to treat as uniformly nontestimonial using dispassionate analysis.
They are mechanically recorded statements, typically videotaped
25
interviews, made by children regarding alleged child abuse. They
obviously have the necessary formality. When those statements are made
to a trained forensic interviewer for the sole purpose of prosecution, they
26
are typically found to be testimonial by the trial court. However, most
statements are not single-purpose statements taken to aid the
prosecution, but rather they serve multiple purposes. Moreover, if the
recording is currently made exclusively for prosecution purposes,
knowledgeable and sophisticated abuse investigative efforts presumably
will change their practices once they recognize that the statement will be
excluded if it remains a single-purpose statement. They may adopt, for
example, medically oriented questioning protocols and/or utilize
medical personnel to conduct the questioning. That will produce either
mixed purpose statements, whose testimonial status is subject to judicial
characterization, or statements that primarily serve a medical purpose
rather than a prosecutorial one, which are automatically freed from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny.
I predict that the end result will turn out to be relatively clear and
consistent despite the uncertain character of some of these statements
with regard to whether they rightfully should be within the protection of
the Confrontation Clause. The key inquiry will be a factual one by the
trial judge to determine the primary purpose of the questioning. That
purpose may arguably be found to be medical in most situations despite
creating highly effective evidence for the prosecution if jurisdictions
structure the interview with a medical orientation. As a result, I suspect
that the trend in future cases will be for trial courts to find most such
27
recordings nontestimonial. These videotapes will be admissible without
any requirement of confrontation as very effective accusatory evidence in
the criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator. Therefore, few of
those mechanically recorded statements will be protected by the
Confrontation Clause, and all that will be needed for admission of the
videotaped statement is an applicable hearsay exception. The result
25
See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4 at 965–75 (discussing
statements that are typically videotaped and made for a variety of purposes).
26
See id. at 963–65 (finding such statement the functional equivalent of police
interrogation). In In re Rolandis G., the Supreme Court of Illinois found that although
the statement was taken by a child advocacy center interviewer as part of an
interdisciplinary approach to the investigation of child sexual abuse, the objective
evidence showed it was conducted at the behest of the police to gather evidence for
prosecution. 902 N.E.2d 600, 613 (Ill. 2008).
27
See, e.g., State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 641–43 (Minn. 2007) (concluding
that multipurpose videotaped statement was not testimonial, despite the assessment
being a joint decision of social services and law enforcement, where the court found
the primary purpose of the interview was the child’s health and welfare).
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28

under Roberts, admission of the statement, would thereby be replicated;
but the Confrontation Clause interest would have received arguably even
less protection, with attention given largely to formalisms such as the
agency for which the person asking the questions worked rather than
whether it was a questionable out-of-court statement particularly in need
of testing by cross-examination.
III. GILES’S FORFEITURE DECISION
As noted earlier, Crawford set out a small number of exceptions to
29
the confrontation right for testimonial statements. Most of them were
either limited in scope or effectively guaranteed a form of
30
confrontation. The only exception denying all confrontation that had
the capacity to expand elastically is forfeiture through wrongdoing. The
extent of elasticity depends on how the intent element of the exception
was interpreted. If intent to silence the witness is not required, I
suggested that in child abuse cases, the commission of the crime would
likely be found to be the reason a child was unable to testify. Moreover, if
the hearsay exception employed to admit the statement does not require
the declarant’s presence and testimony, the prosecution would have little
incentive to work to enable the child to take the stand and be a witness as
opposed to securing testimony of a family member, caseworker, or
psychologist that the child was unable to testify because of the trauma of
31
the offense. Forfeiture eliminates incentives to afford the defendant
with present confrontation when powerful and persuasive hearsay
statements have been made to non-law-enforcement questioners.
32
33
As I argued, and Justice Scalia later observed, dispensing with
confrontation because the trial judge concludes the defendant is guilty

28

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 516 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller,
Confrontation of Witnesses] (listing six exceptions: (1) statements not testimonial in
nature; (2) testimonial statements which have not been previously confronted but
where the declarant is available for confrontation at the current trial; (3) statements
that have previously been confronted and the declarant is presently unavailable; (4)
forfeiture through wrongdoing; (5) dying declarations (perhaps); and (6) statements
not used for their truth).
30
The second and third exceptions listed in the preceding note depend on
confrontation being satisfied either earlier or presently.
31
See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 987 (describing the
process by which the prosecution can help children to be able to testify or can
develop evidence that they are unavailable because of psychological trauma).
32
See Richard D. Friedman, et al., Crawford, Davis, & the Right of Confrontation:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 507, 527 (2007). During the panel
discussion, I observed: “I thought the best rhetorical device of Justice Scalia in
Crawford was that we do not deny the right to trial by jury because a judge makes the
decision that the defendant is guilty. Similarly, under forfeiture, you shouldn’t be
able to deny the right to cross-examination and to confrontation, which might have
29
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resembles the obviously ridiculous position that a judge could dispense
with the entire trial after satisfying herself of the defendant’s guilt. In
Giles, an interestingly divided Court rejected the California Supreme
Court’s conclusion that forfeiture of the confrontation right as a
consequence of the defendant’s wrongdoing did not require an intention
of the defendant to silence the witness’ testimony. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that, in murdering his ex-girlfriend, the defendant
did not forfeit his right to object to a statement she had made to the
police three weeks before the murder regarding acts of domestic violence
committed by the defendant and a threat to kill her if he found her
34
“cheating” on him.
For me, the Supreme Court’s decision to require intent is clearly
proper because of its practical impact on the Confrontation Clause.
Without the intent requirement, the protection of the confrontation
right largely vanishes in whole classes of cases because of factors
unrelated to the underlying values of the right. It is, of course, possible
that the Framers meant for the right to be so narrow in scope. However,
the broad general thrust of the Sixth Amendment in which the right is
located and the general historical understanding of the purpose of the
right suggests no such cramped application. Instead, it is a broad
procedural right that generally guarantees a form of procedure that
places the jury and adversarial testing between a citizen and denial of
liberty by criminal prosecution and conviction.
IV. SOUTER’S PRACTICAL APPROACH
The six-Justice majority in Giles is made up of multiple parts. First,
Scalia wrote an opinion with Roberts fully concurring. Justices Thomas
and Alito concurred in separate opinions with Scalia regarding his
35
forfeiture analysis. However, both Justices concluded that, although the
issue was not presented by the losing party, the victim’s statement to the
police was not within the purview of the Confrontation Clause because it

been the essence of the defendant’s jury trial, because a judge makes exactly the same
kind of decision but just puts a different legal label on it. . . .
“The chief evil of Roberts was its unpredictability and its manipulability. If you
have a forfeiture doctrine that has those same possibilities, I worry. I know it’s a
different doctrine, but the practical results are much the same, especially in child
abuse and domestic violence cases where the alleged crime itself could be argued as
the reason for the person’s unavailability.” Id.
33
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2686 (2008) (“The notion that judges may
strip the defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on
the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does
not sit well with the right to trial by jury. It is akin, one might say, to ‘dispensing with
jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.’” (quoting Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004))).
34
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681–82.
35
Id. at 2693 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2694 (Alito, J., concurring).
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36

was not sufficiently testimonial in that it lacked formality. Souter, with
Ginsburg concurring in his opinion, joined Scalia’s opinion except as to
37
one subpart.
I found Souter’s opinion to present, perhaps, an element of the
future of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Souter refused to concur
in Part II-D-2 of Scalia’s opinion. It is not obvious what precisely Souter
found objectionable in that part of the opinion. Likely it is Scalia’s
trashing of the effort by Justice Breyer in his dissent to develop
Confrontation Clause doctrine based on “policies underlying the
confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that guarantee was
38
historically understood.”
Souter’s opinion seems itself to be based on a somewhat limited
reverence for history and more on practicality and policy. He indicates at
one point that he finds what appears to be Scalia’s broad historical
analysis sound However, at another point, perhaps referring to the
precise lessons of history for fatally abusive domestic relationships, he
states that the contrast between Scalia’s and Breyer’s construction of the
historical record indicates “that the early cases on the exception were not
39
calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here.”
Overall what motivated Souter to embrace the intent requirement
was fear of the alternative. He found an insufficient protection in a
procedural rule that permits the “evidence that the defendant killed [to]
40
come in because the defendant probably killed.” As he stated, it was this
36

Thomas referenced his dissenting position in Davis that the statement in the
Hammon v. Indiana case (the companion case to Davis), which the Court found
testimonial, lacked the degree of formality that he believed was required. Id. at 2693
(citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 840 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Alito
took a similar substantive position, but did not explain either how the statement in
this case differed from the statement in Hammon, where he concurred in the Court’s
determination that the statement had sufficient formality to be found testimonial. See
Davis, 547 U.S. at 815 (noting that Alito joined Scalia’s opinion). Although not
directly announcing their disagreement with the testimonial determination, all other
members of the Court declined to endorse the statements, which were made to a
police officer who responded to a domestic violence complaint, as testimonial. Justice
Scalia’s opinion “accept[ed] without deciding” that the statement was testimonial.
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682. The dissent was somewhat more pointed in its reservation of
decision on whether the statement was testimonial, stating “It is important to
underscore that this case is premised on the assumption, not challenged here, that
the witness’ statements are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Id.
at 2695 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Whether the Justices other than Thomas and Alito are
questioning the testimonial character of statements that would appear rather clearly
testimonial under Davis, or whether they were simply observing that the question was
not being litigated is unclear. Nevertheless, the potentially restrictive attitude toward
what should be a settled issue, that the statements were testimonial, is disconcerting.
37
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
38
Id. at 2691. See also id. (rejecting implicitly the dissent’s reasoning “from the
‘basic purposes and objectives’ of the forfeiture doctrine”).
39
Id. at 2694 (Souter, J., concurring).
40
Id.

686

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:3

practical argument for limiting forfeiture “rather than a dispositive
example from the historical record that persuades me that the Court’s
41
conclusion is the right one in this case.” Again, he repeated the
practical and policy influence that went along with the historical record
in causing him to reach his conclusion:
[T]he substantial indication that the Sixth Amendment was
meant to require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial
process before thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation
right forfeited; otherwise the right would in practical terms boil
down to a measure of reliable hearsay, a view rejected in
Crawford . . . .42
V. THE LIMITS OF ORIGINALISM’S CASE ANALYSIS AS A GUIDE
TO CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONSTRUCTION
I question the capacity of originalism to decide finely tuned issues. I
43
begin with Drayton v. Wells, a case the majority relies upon to support its
44
conclusion, but one that I find completely ambiguous and illustrative of
the reality that claiming there is a settled common law meaning is largely
an act of creation. The case was decided by the South Carolina Court of
Constitutional Appeals in 1819, relatively soon after the adoption of the
45
Sixth Amendment. Justice Scalia cites this case as one of several
authorities, but a quite limited number, that defined the forfeiture
doctrine to involve the “contrivance of the opposite party,” which Scalia
contended at least suggests intentional action meant to prevent the
46
witness from testifying.
However, the context of Drayton v. Wells seems to me to reveal more
about the confusion of the common law by our modern standards than it
tells us anything about the precise issue Scalia was examining. Drayton was
a civil case, an action of assumpsit, on a verbal agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant regarding the plaintiff’s employment as
41

Id.
Id. at 2695.
43
10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 409 (Constitutional Ct. App. 1819).
44
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684.
45
Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 409. I wish to thank Professor Collin
Miller, who brought this case to my attention.
46
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 411).
Scalia finds the explicit statement he supports in an 1858 treatise and the failure of
cases to conclude there was forfeiture in the absence of such intentional action: “An
1858 treatise made the purpose requirement more explicit still, stating that the
forfeiture rule applied when a witness ‘had been kept out of the way by the prisoner,
or by someone on the prisoner’s behalf, in order to prevent him from giving evidence
against him . . . .’ E. POWELL, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 166 (1st ed. 1858)
(emphasis added). The wrongful-procurement exception was invoked in a manner
consistent with this definition. We are aware of no case in which the exception was
invoked although the defendant had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a
witness from testifying, such as offering a bribe.” Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2684.
42
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overseer of a plantation and the compensation for that service. The
plaintiff prevailed at the initial trial of the matter, but the judgment was
48
overturned on appeal. At the retrial, the defendant called a witness who
testified favorably to his position in the first trial, but who had a
49
remarkable failure of memory when called as a witness at the retrial. He
50
testified that he had “totally dismissed the subject from his mind.” The
defendant then sought to introduce evidence in the form of the memory
of witnesses who observed this testimony at the first trial, but the trial
51
judge refused to admit their testimony.
The case is thus not about confrontation at all because it was a civil
case, not a criminal prosecution. Moreover, it was about the rejection of
the failure of memory as a basis for unavailability applied to prior crossexamined testimony, not a separate hearsay or Confrontation Clause
exception that is at issue with forfeiture through wrongdoing in Giles.
The South Carolina appellate court stated:
The books enumerate four cases only, in which the testimony of
a witness who has been examined in a former trial, between the
same parties, and where the point in issue was the same, may be
given in evidence, on a second trial, from the mouths of other
witnesses, who heard him give evidence: 1st. Where the witness was
dead. 2nd. Where he was insane. 3rd. Where he was beyond seas;
and 4th. Where the Court was satisfied the witness had been kept
away by the contrivance of the opposite party.52
The court did not tell us what books were examined, but its
understanding was that forfeiture constituted a basis for unavailability
under what had to be the hearsay doctrine, along with death, for the
admission of prior testimony. It is hard to see how this case provides
much support for Scalia’s position since it lists death as also sufficient for
the function performed here by “forfeiture.” It is equally difficult to see
how this case supports the opposite position that forfeiture was at that
historical moment anything more than an unavailability concept that
applied to one specific type of hearsay—prior testimony. There is no
indication that the court understood forfeiture to be a separate ground
for admission of hearsay or an exception to the confrontation right,
which was irrelevant to its decision. There is nothing in the opinion
about any separate understanding that would distinguish hearsay and
confrontation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if it were my
47

Drayton, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 409.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 410. The turnabout was so dramatic that one might wonder whether
witness tampering—strict forfeiture conduct—by the plaintiff might have been
involved. However, apparently the defendant did not think to pursue the issue. Thus,
neither unavailability through forfeiture nor admission through forfeiture are part of
the case.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 411.
48
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choice, I would not turn the definition of the Confrontation Clause in
the twenty-first century over to the perhaps mistaken understanding of
the law by three South Carolina judges two hundred years ago or our
mistaken interpretation of the meaning of their strange sounding
analysis.
Justice Scalia cites several English and American cases that he
contends demonstrate that the forfeiture doctrine operated at common
law as a basis for admission of statements that had not been previously
53
confronted. The number of authorities is hardly impressive to
demonstrate a clearly developed doctrine rather than either an
aberration, a mistake, or a reflection of changing historical
understanding. In reaching its conclusion, Scalia even notes that “the
54
case law is sparse.” Potentially of critical importance, the only Supreme
55
Court decision, Reynolds v. United States, involved prior cross-examined
testimony, but Scalia argues that fact is not significant because the Court
did not explicitly recognize prior confrontation as a necessary condition
56
of the forfeiture exception’s application. Obviously, the Supreme Court
need not make the observation that other preconditions exist to decide
the question of whether forfeiture occurred, but despite Scalia’s claim in
Giles, Reynolds seems to have recognized and relied on the existence of
57
prior cross-examination.
I cannot make a directly contrary claim because the cases Scalia cites
clearly do exist. What I do contend is that they do not clearly establish a
strong forfeiture doctrine separate from the forfeiture ground for
admission of previously confronted statements. In the recent
Confrontation Clause cases, I believe too much weight is placed on a
purpose driven reading of authorities of uncertain meaning. Moreover,
no attention is given to the fact that the hearsay doctrine was changing
throughout this period with little emphasis placed at times on prior
confrontation in the sense of cross-examination and at times more on the
importance of the hearsay being in writing; or that the declarant had
58
been under oath or that the accused had been present. Also, the cases
53

Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2688–90 (2008) (citing principally
Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833 (Old Bailey 1692) (statement before coroner);
Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (statement before grand jury); and
State v. Lewis, 1 Del Cas. 608 (Ct. Quarter Sess. 1818) (statement before grand jury)).
54
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2691.
55
98 U.S. 145 (1879).
56
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2690–91.
57
As Robert Kry has carefully developed in his contribution to this symposium,
the Reynolds Court’s description of the case and citations to other authorities indicate
that it did indeed understand and assume that the prior statement had been subject
to confrontation. See Robert Kry, Forfeiture and Cross-Examination, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV 577, 600–01 (2009). See also Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161 (“The accused was present at
the time the testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination. This
brings the case clearly within the well-established rules.”).
58
See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine
Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 737–42
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are treated as if they are all correctly decided under a widely shared
understanding of the common law hearsay doctrine of that time. This
approach assumes a type of unerring omniscient understanding among
jurists, which I do not believe can be accurately claimed for any set of
judges or courts in modern history. I suspect there is more certainty in
Justice Scalia’s mind than there was in those of the jurists of the relevant
period or in the actual status of the historical record rather than his
construction of it.
There are two keys to Scalia’s originalist position in Giles. The first is
his position, initially stated in Crawford and now the central basis for
shaping the Confrontation Clause application to modern practices: “the
Confrontation Clause is ‘most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
59
established at the time of the founding.’” It does appear, however, that
Scalia now interprets “is most naturally read” from Crawford to mean “is
read.” In his view, either the statement was historically treated as hearsay
requiring confrontation or the Clause is inapplicable, but if applicable,
the Clause operates absent a recognized historical exception.
In Giles, he adds a new element that the exceptions he is referring to
are, of course, hearsay, rather than confrontation, exceptions. He states:
No case or treatise that we have found, however, suggested that a
defendant who committed wrongdoing forfeited his confrontation
rights but not his hearsay rights. And the distinction would have
been a surprising one, because courts prior to the founding
excluded hearsay evidence in large part because it was
unconfronted.60
This statement makes sense because, before the Bill of Rights was
adopted, the confrontation concept had no real independent status. This
acknowledgement is accurate and therefore devastating to Breyer’s
position that killing a witness automatically forfeits the confrontation
right. The numerous cases that excluded dying declarations in homicide
cases where the declarant was insufficiently aware he was about to die
render untenable the broad position that intent to silence the witness was

(describing the hearsay doctrine of the late eighteenth century as putting special
emphasis on the oath and much less significance on cross-examination than was the
view of the early nineteenth century). The emphasis on the oath could explain the
admission of the sworn testimony, which was involved certainly in the two grand jury
cases cited by Scalia and perhaps all three authorities, despite the absence of crossexamination, and as a result could undercut their power to support a separate
forfeiture admissibility doctrine as opposed to its use to establish unavailability for
statements that satisfied a different hearsay doctrine. The primacy of crossexamination developed somewhat in tandem with the expansion of the role of
counsel at trial. Id. at 741.
59
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2682 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54
(2004)).
60
Id. at 2686.

690

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:3

61

historically understood to be unnecessary. And Scalia explicitly and
correctly interprets this as conclusive historical evidence demonstrating
that without an intent to silence the witness an intentional killing was
insufficient under the common law understanding of the Framing period
62
to warrant forfeiture. If intent was irrelevant, the killing of the declarant
by itself would have warranted admission under the forfeiture doctrine
regardless of the declarant’s understanding of death’s certainty and
nearness.
Scalia’s recognition that hearsay exceptions at the time of the
Framing and Confrontation Clause formulation were largely identical is
substantively an almost necessary position for an originalist. The
historical materials give us no clear understanding of whatever separate
meaning the Confrontation Clause was meant to have. The case materials
only deal with hearsay developments. Because the Framers were silent on
their intent, one recognizes the indeterminacy of the historical record, or
relies on common law hearsay doctrine that one constructs from the
sources, or necessarily moves to a determination of values, policy, and
practical concerns. It is to those other sources that I have a sense from
Giles that a number of the Justices are now turning.
This recognition of the fundamental linkage of the hearsay rule of
the Framing era and the Confrontation Clause is, it seems to me,
devastating theoretically to the idea that the Confrontation Clause was
63
intended to cover only testimonial statements. There was no such

61
Id. at 2685–86 (citing numerous English and American cases excluding dying
declarations by the victim implicating the defendant in homicide cases where the
declarant lacked the required understanding that death was near at hand).
62
Id. at 2688.
63
See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban
Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope
of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349, 352–53 (2007). In summary,
Davies states: “the framing-era authorities indicate that admission of hearsay
statements would have violated basic principles of common-law criminal evidence. In
particular, the framing-era sources indicate that the confrontation right itself
prohibited the use of hearsay statements as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The
condemnations of hearsay that appeared in prominent and widely used framing-era
authorities typically recognized that the admission of a hearsay statement would
deprive the defendant of the opportunity to cross-examine the speaker in the
presence of the trial jury, and that opportunity to cross-examine was understood to be
a salient aspect of the confrontation right. Thus, the framing-era sources actually
suggest that the Framers would not have approved of the hearsay exceptions that
were later invented because the Framers would have perceived such exceptions to
violate a defendant’s confrontation right.
“Hence, Crawford’s testimonial formulation of the scope of the confrontation
right does not reflect ‘the Framers’ design.’ Rather, Crawford’s permissive allowance
of unsworn hearsay is inconsistent with the basic premises that shaped the Framers’
understanding of the right. Thus, whatever might be said for or against Crawford’s
formulation as a matter of contemporary constitutional policy, the fictional character
of the historical claims made in that opinion constitute further evidence that
originalism is a defective approach to constitutional decision-making.” Id.
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concept in common law hearsay doctrine as a testimonial statement
doctrine. Instead, the common law’s general position was that, whenever
hearsay was actually recognized, it was excluded absent confrontation.
Many of the recognized types of hearsay at the time of the Bill of Right’s
enactment were in documentary form, but not all, and if the theory of
hearsay exclusion rested on our modern sense of personal confrontation
and cross-examination, testimonial formalism is not the defining feature
that might have spurred creation of the Sixth Amendment’s
64
confrontation right.
Moreover, maintaining the testimonial restriction is to give our
modern practices over to the accidental state of the law at the time of the
Framing rather than to the values that the right conveyed in the
historical period when the amendment was enacted. If the historical
understanding is imprecise, as I contend it is, positions asserted
regarding the contours of the historical record will likely reflect value
judgments that motivate the specific interpretation given to historical
sources rather than an independent historical reality.
VI. THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE AND THE CONFRONTATION
DOCTRINE MOVING FORWARD
Those who supported a broad forfeiture rule, which would have a
significant effect in homicide, domestic violence, and child sexual abuse
cases, did not get the result they hoped for in Giles. However, there is
some substantial room left for forfeiture to operate occasionally in
homicide prosecutions and more frequently in domestic violence and
child abuse cases. The forfeiture doctrine would have its impact despite
Giles’s intent requirement through trial court findings of intent to
discourage testimony by the witness, who is most often the crime victim
in forfeiture cases.
Davis drew a distinction between statements that are covered by the
testimonial concept because they are efforts by the police to gather facts
about past events in a nonemergency situation and those excluded from
Confrontation Clause coverage because they were made during an on65
going emergency. On the facts in Davis, the Court ruled that the
66
emergency had ended when the accused left the victim’s home.
64
Indeed, in his contribution to this symposium, Professor Davies notes that the
focus on testimonial statements gets the understanding of the law at the time of the
framing backward. Non-formal statements were even more clearly rejected than were
those which would be categorized as testimonial today. See Thomas Y. Davies, Selective
Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’ Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or
Were Not “Established at the Time of the Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 664–66
(2009).
65
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
66
Id. at 828–29. “In this case, for example, after the operator gained the
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears
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However, the Court did not fault the nontestimonial treatment of
statements identifying the perpetrator when made as part of a
67
communication that was otherwise focused on the emergency. It ruled
that the fact that the perpetrator left the victim’s location together with
the investigative-type questions that were being asked by the 9-1-1
68
operator at that point rendered the statements testimonial. However,
there is no definitive indication that the Court established the
perpetrator’s departure as a rigid litmus test of when the emergency
ended, nor did it rule that testimonial status depended on any particular
fact.
As a consequence, substantial discretion has been given to trial
judges to determine by factual construction of the emergency or
nonemergency nature of the situation the testimonial character of
statements, particularly when the statements are made shortly after a
domestic assault. I have no definitive data, but I believe trial courts have
taken the opportunity to rule nontestimonial a substantial number of
statements made after the domestic violence has ended by finding that
69
the period of the emergency was on-going. While Davis clearly made

to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises). The operator then told
McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions. It could readily
be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry’s statements were testimonial, not
unlike the ‘structured police questioning’ that occurred in Crawford.” Id. (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004)).
67
Id. at 827. “[T]he nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again
viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to
resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had
happened in the past. That is true even of the operator’s effort to establish the
identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers might know whether they
would be encountering a violent felon.” Id.
68
Id. at 828–29.
69
See, e.g., Vinson v. State, 221 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (finding ongoing emergency on facts quite similar to those in Hammon v. Indiana, the
companion case to Davis (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826–27)); Andrew Dylan, Note,
Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1905, 1926 (2007). “One commentator has argued for an aggressive expansion of the
emergency concept: ‘Davis can easily be interpreted to make every single surrounding
circumstance, known or unknown, possibly associated with the statement itself
relevant in deciding emergency versus prosecutorial.’ No court has explicitly
announced its support for such an expansive view of the ongoing emergency concept,
but under the open-ended language of Davis, the trial courts seem to have wide
leeway in determining the scope of the ongoing emergency test.
“Rather than taking a clear theoretical stand, most courts applying the ongoing
emergency test simply delve directly into some form of fact-intensive inquiry and then
announce their results. Often, despite Davis’s admonition that the existence of the
ongoing emergency must be determined objectively, the lower courts will base their
determinations on the subjective perceptions of either the declarant or the
interviewer who was at the scene.” Id.
Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer has argued for a systemically broad concept of
emergency in the domestic violence context because of the character of the abusive
relationship. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2007);
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domestic violence cases more difficult to prosecute successfully by
excluding some 9-1-1 calls and many communications with first
responders, the Supreme Court gave lower courts some flexibility in
shaping the dimensions of testimonial statements through their role as
fact finder, and this authority has resulted in fact-based contraction of
the scope of Confrontation Clause coverage.
Similarly, in Giles, the Supreme Court recognized that a pattern of
abuse might support a finding that the defendant did intend by his
violence to silence the victim. The Court stated:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to
prevent testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal
prosecutions. Where such an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime
expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from
reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal
prosecution—rendering her prior statements admissible under the
forfeiture doctrine. Earlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to
dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly
relevant to this inquiry, as would evidence of ongoing criminal
proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to
testify.70
Justice Souter stated in his concurring opinion that:
[the historical materials demonstrate no]. . . reason to doubt that
the element of intention would normally be satisfied by the intent
inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help,
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process. If the
evidence for admissibility shows a continuing relationship of this
sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the oppressing
defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the
instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger.71
Given Breyer’s statement for three other Justices that forfeiture exists
automatically in the homicide case, every Justice adopted at least the
position that a pattern of abuse can result in a finding of intent to silence
72
the victim as a witness in homicide cases.
Although the Supreme Court’s discussion focused on an abusive
situation that ended in homicide, nothing in the Court’s rationale would
prohibit its application where a pattern of violence ends in a violent
assault and the living victim fails to cooperate in the prosecution or to
appear at trial. Evidence of a pattern of conduct that prompts the loss of

Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and the Right of
Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006).
70
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
71
Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring).
72
Id. at 2696–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the victim’s testimony would also qualify under the forfeiture
requirement of Giles since that showing would satisfy the intent
requirement. Although this is a more limited fact-based exception than
the continuing emergency of Davis, it is a real and potentially significant
one.
In child abuse cases, a showing of intent to silence the witness is also
possible if caused by threats that victims sometime report abusers have
made to them. As I noted in an earlier Article, occasionally one finds in
published cases that “the perpetrator has warned the child not to reveal
the information, and occasionally children will understand that ‘telling
73
on’ the perpetrator will get him into trouble.” Some scholars contend
74
that such threats are frequent in child sexual abuse cases. It may be that
forfeiture will rarely be at issue because most statements in sexual abuse
cases will be considered nontestimonial under a narrow construction of
the doctrine that includes virtually only those statements made to law
enforcement investigators. However, if the statements are found to be
75
testimonial, this fact-based forfeiture argument that the child was
76
intimidated into silence will be available, if established by the facts, to
77
support forfeiture of confrontation rights.

73

Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4, at 946.
See Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1017, 1068–70 (2000) (discussing threats and inducements that perpetrators
use in an attempt to discourage the child from reporting the abuse (citing JUDITH
LEWIS HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 88 (1981) (noting that many of the incest
victims interviewed reported threats that included the warning that their fathers
would be put in jail if it were reported); and BARBARA E. SMITH & SHARON GORETSKY
ELSTEIN, THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES: FINAL REPORT
93 (1993) (describing threats not to reveal abuse included both warnings of physical
violence against the child or others and “pleas that the abuser would get into trouble
if the child told”))).
75
Under these circumstances, the statement should be admitted because of
forfeiture but not because it is a nontestimonial statement if the trial court properly
considers the child’s purpose in making the statement. The threat by the perpetrator
should cement the child’s understanding that reporting the information will have
serious consequences, such as prosecuting the perpetrator, and establishes a
testimonial intent by the child. See Mosteller, Exceptions to Confrontation, supra note 4,
at 946. However, many courts almost categorically exclude statements made to private
individuals or focus on the primary purpose of the questioner, which with most early
conversations will usually be the welfare of the child when the person asking the
question is not a government investigator.
76
Not all such evidence will be sufficient. In In re Rolandis G., the Illinois
Supreme Court found that a “pinky swear” not to tell anyone else about the oral sex
act obtained by an eleven-year old accused by a six-year old male victim was not
sufficiently directed at a future trial to constitute forfeiture under Giles. In re Rolandis,
902 N.E.2d 600, 616 (Ill. 2008). Whether the result would have been different in this
court’s opinion if an adult abuser had threatened physical violence if the abuse were
revealed is unclear. My point is not that the evidence will always be sufficient, but
promises of this sort or threats as part of the sex act provide a basis for argument
regarding Giles forfeiture that is distinct from the rejected position that forfeiture
74
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VII. CONCLUSION
In my first article after Crawford was decided, I took the position that
the confrontation right should be broadly interpreted and the forfeiture
78
right should be narrowly construed. My point was not that the new right
should or could become a “get-out-of-jail-free card” for the defendants.
My response to the prospect of massive jail delivery and a windfall to
guilty defendants in the exclusion of testimony was to encourage
confrontation rather than to avoid it by finding a forfeiture of the right. I
am particularly supportive of that result with children, where I believe
successful efforts to make children comfortable in the courtroom leads to
fulfillment of the confrontation right, often to successful testimony, and
sometimes to empowered children.
Certainly the result in Davis’s companion case Hammon v. Indiana
was a blow to domestic violence prosecutions, but had it decided that an
interview one hour after the violence, with police officers on the scene
and the situation secure, was not testimonial, the blow to the
confrontation right would have been devastating across a broad range of
criminal cases. I believe similarly that, although Giles is also a blow to
domestic violence prosecutions, the opposite—that forfeiture did not
require an intent to silence the witness, which would not have been
confined to the limited class of homicide cases—would have been
devastating to maintaining the integrity of the new Confrontation Clause
system. Pressures are great to find exceptions to its rigors. Easy forfeiture
could gut the right in entire classes of cases and statements. Such a result
could be particularly unfortunate given how narrowly the testimonial
statement concept is being interpreted.
My clear perception is that lower courts are generally interpreting
the new confrontation right quite narrowly under the testimonial
79
concept. I assume that rather consistent pattern of conservative
interpretation of scope of the right will continue. We are well on our way
to developing a useful, if unnecessarily narrow, Confrontation Clause.
cannot be found simply by a judicial decision that the defendant committed a violent
crime or sexual abuse against the victim-declarant.
77
Of course, the prosecution must overcome the defense argument that
forfeiture is illogical because the child was obviously not intimidated from reporting
by the perpetrator’s threat. Given that fact, the argument goes, there is no reason to
believe the victim failed to testify because of that ineffectual threat. Any renewed
threats would clearly overcome this argument, and perhaps expert psychological
testimony could provide another basis for finding that the much earlier threat
ultimately had its intended effect.
78
See Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 29, at 519 (describing an
approach that favors a broad definition of the testimonial concept, limits forfeiture,
and encourages confrontation rather than exclusion).
79
See generally Josephine Ross, After Crawford Double-Speak: “Testimony” Does Not
Mean Testimony and “Witness” Does Not Mean Witness, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147,
166 (2006) (finding lower court opinions consistently conservative in interpreting the
potentially expansive testimonial statement doctrine).
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Giles, like Davis, avoided certain grave injury to the right, but nothing in
those opinions renews the revolutionary feel of Crawford in the heady
days immediately after the decision when its scope was potentially quite
80
broad and retrenchment had not yet begun.

80

The testimonial concept was then so potentially broad that one possible
definition was “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial” and so undefined that the Court listed three possible general definitions.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae
the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford,
541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410)).

